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TODD GITLIN
──────────────

Political Ignorance in
an Information-Soaked World

The title of this is talk meant to be paradoxical. On the face of it, it
seems extremely odd that we should be ignorant in a society so
saturated by information. Information society: I'm sure that you've
heard this expression. It is omnipresent. It does seem, on the face of it,
sort of odd that people so bombarded by information should be as
ignorant as we are. So what I want to do is first of all talk about the part
played by information in the theory of democracy. Secondly, I'm going
to try to lay out some of the dimensions that can be measured of just
how ignorant we are. And third, I'm going to try to explain why we are
as ignorant as we are.
First, the theory of democracy and its relation to information.
There are many variants of the theory of democracy, going back to the
Greeks, who in general weren't very pleased with it. But all theories of
democracy have a special place in them for knowledge, and the
premise of all democratic theories that I can think of is that the people
are capable of ruling themselves, which is what democracy means,
insofar as they are capable of understanding the situation they are in.
After all, only when they're capable of recognizing the situation are
they capable of putting their heads together and governing themselves.
It's a no-brainer that knowledge is essential. Those who were skeptical
about democracy and its prospects were skeptical about it because they
didn't believe that knowledge _______________
Todd Gitlin is Professor of Journalism and Sociology at Columbia University.
This is a lightly-edited version of a talk delivered on February 18, 2004, at
Sacred Heart University as part of the College of Arts and Sciences Lecture
Series on Media and Society.
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was possible for more than a narrow and self-perpetuating elite. Plato,
for example, begins the great history of anti-democratic reasoning by
arguing in the Republic that only a self-selected body, a body of people
educated in a special fashion, could amalgamate their knowledge of the
world in such a way as to train themselves to exempt themselves from
the ordinary run of human existence so that they could pay attention to
the affairs of the republic, of the government as a whole. And more
recently, over the last three centuries, more or less, those who've been
more welcoming to the prospect of democracy were welcoming
because they believed that when citizens put their minds together they
can actually adequately and accurately appraise the situation they live
in and arrive at the knowledge of what is in their collective interest, and
therefore that they are capable of government as Lincoln said
memorably, of, by, and for the people.
So knowledge occupies a special place in the theory of democracy,
and therefore those who have been critical of tyranny ─ in recent times
probably nobody more compellingly than George Orwell, though
there have been many others who have warned against tyranny ─ have
been skeptical of tyranny in part because they saw tyrants as people
who monopolized information and lied. So those who've been
opposed to tyranny in the name of democracy have been opposed to it
in the name of the ideal of sharing information, and they have hated
the fact that one thing that tyrants do is seal off information to protect
themselves from public knowledge, and hide from the consequences
of people's thirst for knowledge. They have regarded knowledge as a
weapon of those who believe in themselves against those who would
wrongfully deprive them of knowledge. So it is not surprising that in an
age of vastly improved means of communication, many people have
argued that the means of communication are the means of
enlightenment.
If you go to New York and walk over to Rockefeller Center to
what used to be the RCA Building ─ it is now the GE building, the
building that is the headquarters of the National Broadcasting
Corporation ─ if you walk over to the Sixth Avenue side, you will see a
mural. It's a mosaic actually. It was put up during the Great
Depression, and it means to be an allegory about the triumph of radio
in that day; that was the primary, the most advanced form of
communication. You'll see that the imagery in this model is very
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straightforward: it has to do with angels and devils. The angels are the
forces of communication, and they emit signals adorned with labels
like ``Truth,'' ``Poetry,'' ``Theater,'' ``Science,'' and other forms of
the humanities and of knowledge. And the devils are ``Poverty,''
``Ignorance,'' ``Oppression.'' And these devils have been smitten,
have been struck by beams emanating from the angels, and therefore
the devils are falling out of the sky. That utopian ideal about the power
of communication is sort of the standard utopia that is affirmed by all
those who value the means of communication ─ and nowhere more
than in the so-called Information Society, in which it is conventionally
assumed, as it was said biblically, that you shall know the truth and the
truth shall set you free. The way the truth arrives is in bundles of
information. The more information, the better. The more sources of
information, the better. And when people have access to information,
they're capable of distilling information into knowledge, and on the
basis of that knowledge, arriving at an understanding of the world
which permits them to govern themselves.
Now, by the same token it would follow that insofar as people are
ignorant of their true circumstances, they are not capable of governing
themselves. They may not even be capable of protecting themselves.
Why have we been in such a collective uproar for years now about the
adequacy of our intelligence services? This isn't a debate about
whether we are served. The debate about intelligence, the debate
about the adequacy of our security knowledge, is finally a debate about
whether we are capable of protecting ourselves. I don't have to
convince you that this is extremely important. And it is also taken for
granted, and I thing rightly so, that a people who are ignorant are not
capable of protecting themselves, and part of our ongoing debate
about our capacity to protect ourselves is a debate as to whether those
of us who need information are able to get access to it.
So the question whether we are adequately informed to form a
picture of the world is not just idle curiosity about the history of
democratic theory. It is an essential element in a very practical and
material debate about the future of our civilization. If we can
comprehend the world, then we can manage our place in it. If we
cannot comprehend the world, we are in effect helpless. And it is, I
think, evident, whether we look at military dangers, ecological dangers,
or economic dangers, that in a world interconnected with the
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profundity that ours is, that a people who are unable to appraise the
reality of the world have been disarmed, have proved themselves
incapable of managing their place in the world. So ignorance, which is
certainly an unending challenge to democratic life, becomes an even
more urgent challenge in a time when what we don't know can hurt us,
and in fact is essentially guaranteed to hurt us.
So how well off are we? How knowledgeable are Americans?
How, therefore, capable or not are we of managing our own affairs?
I'm speaking here of our ability to understand the world, to understand
our place in it, understand what we need to know in order to govern
ourselves. But understanding is very hard to appraise. Once upon a
time, I was a mathematician, so I still have a respect for hard fact, and
in order to talk about the kind of knowledge that is circulating, I'm
going to use a sort of surrogate for understanding. I'm going to use
information, facts, people's ability to know facts. I'm not somebody
who believes that facts are the same as knowledge, by the way. I think
you can know a lot of facts and be deeply ignorant about how the
world works. We have a whole industry that regales us with
information, the sum of which I don't think contributes very deeply to
our ability to understand what really matters. I am referring here to the
trivia industry. If you go to a movie and wait for the movie to start, you
will be bombarded by facts, but this is hardly the sort of fact that I
think enables you to grasp your place in the world, your place in the
country, the country's place in the world, let alone your place in the
universe. I hope I'm not mistaking trivial knowledge for deep
knowledge. But one of the virtues of appraising our knowledge of fact
is that at least we have a lot of evidence. We have a lot of evidence
about what people know. And let me give you a few examples from
recent surveys about what Americans know about some important
matters in the world, some urgent matters.
Consider, for example, a poll taken by one of the best of our
media polling institutions, the Washington Post, last August. From this
poll we learn that 69% of Americans said that they thought it was at
least likely ─ either likely or extremely likely in terms of the
questionnaire ─ that Saddam Hussein was involved in the attacks on
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001.
Sixty-nine percent of Americans said that they thought it was at least
likely. This past January, just before the second Gulf War began,
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another reputable poll asked people ``To the best of your knowledge,
how many of the September 11 hijackers were Iraqi citizens?''
Seventeen percent, one in six, knew the right answer, which is none.
Forty-four percent believed that most or some of the hijackers were
Iraqi. Another 6% believed that the correct answer was one. So in
other words, a full 50% were mistaken, three times as many as were
right.
Here's another poll. Since June of last year, another good polling
agency has been asking a sample of Americans whether it is their
impression that the United States has or has not found clear evidence
in Iraq that Saddam Hussein was working closely with the Al Qaeda
terrorist organization. In a poll of last August and September, 49% said
that they believed the United States had found such evidence, 45% said
that they believed the U.S. had not found such evidence, and 6% did
not know. Twenty-four percent said they believed that Iraqi weapons
of mass destruction have been found. Of course, there is no evidence
that has been found that Saddam Hussein is working closely with the
Al Qaeda organization, and no Iraqi weapons of mass destruction have
been found.
So those are some of the dimensions of the problem that I want to
address. How does it happen that so many Americans have such a
wrong idea about such essential matters, matters that were held to be
so urgent as to justify a war of choice? The first thing one should do
when one is asking this sort of question is to ask it historically, to ask
whether there is a rising, a falling, or more or less an even level of
ignorance of foreign matters at least. Americans have long been a
people graced by geography, isolated from the rest of the world
spatially, and therefore with a certain luxury of ignorance. So it's not
surprising, for example, that according to a poll taken in 1986, a
majority of Americans couldn't name the leader of the Soviet Union.
It's hard to compare how many Americans, let's say, in 1966 or 1956
knew the name of Gorbachev's equivalent. But I think the evidence
that I've been able to collect ─ and there's not a lot of evidence of this
sort ─ says that if you believe that Americans have become more
knowledgeable in the last decade, let's say, as against fifty years ago, you
would be mistaken. There's no evidence of that, and in fact there's considerable evidence that it isn't true.
I'm not going to impose a lot of numbers on you, but just a few by
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way of some comparisons that are of interest. For example, when
people are polled about their knowledge of foreign leaders, we see that
in 1964 when people were asked if they could identify de Gaulle, 73%
could. In 1990, when they were asked to identify Gorbachev, just
about the same number, 71%, could. De Gaulle and Gorbachev are
not exactly equivalent, but knowledge of the name of such a foreign
leader at least doesn't show any great meteoric increase in public
knowledge. A couple of other comparisons, not of knowledge of
foreign leaders but of foreign questions in general, might be of interest.
In 1948, for example, a poll asked whether people were aware that the
Soviet Union was communist. Seventy-eight percent were. In 1985,
thirty-seven years later, they were asked if they knew that mainland
China was communist, and the percentage was 77, almost identical. No
increase there. In 1954, asked whether East Germany was communist,
55% knew that it was. In 1989, when asked whether people knew that
West Germany was a member of NATO, 50%, roughly the same
number, said yes.
I have more numbers of this sort, and you'd be hard-pressed to
look at these numbers and say that there's been an improvement in
public information about these rather crude but nonetheless rather
substantial questions. Here's another way in which we might look at
these numbers. It's of interest to ask whether Americans are more or
less knowledgeable about the world than people in other countries.
After all, we don't exist in some sort of pure domain. It's important to
understand whether Americans are more or less knowledgeable than
others. We don't have very many surveys of this, but we do have some.
In 1994, for example, the same five questions about various world
figures and so on, were asked of people in the United States, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Of the
people in those countries, the Americans surpassed only the Spaniards
in their knowledge of the answers to these questions. Thirty-seven
percent of Americans couldn't answer any of the questions correctly.
And only 15% could answer at least four of the five. By the way, in case
you're curious, the questions were: are: Who is the president of
Russia? Which country is threatening to withdraw from the
non-proliferation treaty? Who is Boutros Boutros Ghali? Which
ethnic group has conquered much of Bosnia? And with which group
have the Israelis recently reached a peace accord? The United States
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was next to last in that ranking, and in a survey of ten countries
conducted by National Geographic, America's knowledge of world
geography ranked near the bottom.
So at the very least I think it can be pretty well established that
since the 1950s, the first period about which we have significant data,
the factual knowledge of foreign affairs has failed to increase. Now
here's what's really interesting: something else has changed in
American's presumed ability to comprehend the world since then. If
we compare the educational statistics between the present and the
1950s, we discover that Americans are a far better educated people
than was true fifty years ago. The percentages of Americans with
high-school degrees, with college degrees, with some college, or with
post-graduate degrees, all have grown. And yet in spite of these
changes, Americans are not better informed about the world than they
were fifty years ago.
Let me give you an example of how much and how little
difference education makes in terms of people's knowledge about
some of these urgent foreign matters. We have a poll from last August,
also done by the Washington Post, in which people were asked
whether it was likely or not that Saddam Hussein had a link to the
September attacks: ``Is it likely that Hussein was involved in the
September attacks?'' was the question. If you are a high-school
graduate, or had less of an education than that, 76% of you thought
that it was likely that there was that connection. Seventy-six percent of
those with a high-school degree or less, as opposed to those with a
post-graduate degree, of whom 45% thought it was likely that Saddam
Hussein had a link with the September 11th hijackers. There was a
positive correlation between information and college or post-graduate
education, but a majority of college graduates were still remarkably
ignorant of some essential information on what was at the time, what
has been for the last two and a half years, probably the most urgent
questions about America's relation to the rest of the world. Of those
who were college graduates in this survey, 62% thought that it was
either very likely or somewhat likely that Saddam Hussein was
connected to the September 11 hijackers. So the benign assumption
that education is destined to wipe out ignorance is profoundly
simplistic. There is no evidence for it, and there is the kind of evidence
that I've just cited against it.
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Here's something else I find troubling. In surveys that were taken
from the 1940s, 1950s, and the 1960s, young people were about as
knowledgeable as older people on questions about political issues and
public figures. But in the mid-1970s, a gulf opened up between these
generational groups, the gulf of political knowledge, and that gulf has
not diminished. That is, now there is a strong correlation between age
and political knowledge, and it doesn't tilt toward the young: it tilts
toward the old. Roughly speaking, the old are more knowledgeable
than the young. So we have to speak of what I come to think of as a
sort of ambient ignorance. Ignorance has become the normal
condition of American knowledge. Now, why should that be? What
has changed in the last thirty, forty, fifty years? Why can we speak of
ignorance as the standard condition, to which there are of course
exceptions? I don't think this can be attributed, by the way, to the
policies of a particular government, because the sort of tendency that I
am talking about is the sort of tendency that began before the current
administration, and it will, I have no doubt, outlast it.
I think there are many reasons why Americans have become
more ignorant of the world, as well as reasons why it's more dangerous
for us to be more ignorant. But I want to focus on one particular
question. It is the question that I dwell on in my book, Media
Unlimited, and the more I think about this question, the more I am
persuaded that the most significant force in creating ambient ignorance
is a force that is not generally given its due in public conversation. So I
am going to dwell on this by way of counter-balancing the rather
superficial way in which I think this subject is generally discussed. I
want to argue, briefly, that there is a condition in the life experience of
the young in particular which has become the normal experience in
American society, and which is not conducive to political knowledge.
In fact it is detrimental to political knowledge: our immersion in a
virtually non-stop environment of media saturation, so that our normal
experience of everyday life is one that filters through the images,
sounds, and stories which come to us through a vast host of channels.
This non-stop, wrap-around, 24/7 media environment is something
that we now take for granted as an everyday experience. It is, in fact,
the everyday experience of the American young ─ not just the
American young, by the way, but this process is more advanced in the
United States than virtually elsewhere else.
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Let me just mention a few statistics which might give you some
sense of the magnitude of this media immersion. Consider the life that
an American child has at home. For a moment, leave aside what
happens when you leave home. We have a very good survey, done in
1999, of the media experience of American children. Here are some
of the findings. If we take all American children, from age two to
eighteen, and average that, this average child is in the presence of at
least one of the media for about siz and three-quarter hours a day. Of
this six and three-quarter hours, a little less than three-quarter hours
consists of time spent reading. The rest is spent with television, with
recorded music, with the Internet, video games, and the like. About
two-thirds of American children, as of 1999, have in their bedrooms a
television set, a radio, a tape player, and a video game console. What is
also striking is that the experience of these children in their bedrooms
is pretty well invariant across a whole lot of categories. It doesn't seem
to matter much whether you are white or black or Hispanic or another
race or ethnicity, whether you live in a rich neighborhood or a poor
neighborhood, whether you are a boy or a girl. This is pretty much a
uniform experience.
And so far I've just been talking about the bedroom. Let's add in
not only the rest of the stuff that's in the house but the experience that
one has when one leaves the house, whether it's the experience of
billboards, of the screens that are the accompaniment of shops in the
mall, the screens that are the accompaniments of a trip on the bus or
on a plane, all the stuff that comes through cell phones and the
Walkmen and the GameBoys and the rest of these devices. The life
that has come to be considered a normal life is a sound-track life, it's
an iPod life, it's life in the company of orchestrated mood-setting
emotion-inducing images, sounds, and stories. Now it's not new at all,
by any means, in human history that people are attracted by and find
some value in replicas of life, whether visual artifacts, sculptures,
paintings, stain-glass, what have you, or theatrical spectacles. It's not by
any means new. There's no society that I can imagine, certainly none
I've ever read or heard about, in which there is not an organized artistic
experience, although often it is an experience that's not separated from
religious experience. There's no society we know of in which there are
not icons and representations of mythologies of the tribe or of the clan
or of the people. There is no society that we know of in which there is
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not a collection of legends about how things are in the world and what
the ultimate sources of power and meaning are.
So it's by no means new that we have access to theater, to ballads,
to various renditions of human life, human and animal and divine life.
But what is remarkable is that in this society, so much of our attention
is given to these images, sounds, and stories, that attention to them is
the major thing that we do as a civilization. It is the major thing that we
do as a civilization when we are not asleep, and when we are not at
work. And given the way in which we work, I think it's also true that
much of the time that people are at work they are also in contact with
the world of images, sounds, and stories that are piped in. And this is
unprecedented: the amount of attention. The amount of attention that
is spent is of such a magnitude that I think it's fair to say that if you
were a visiting Martian and you wanted to know what are the essential
features of our civilization, you would pay attention not to what people
profess to be their values or their commitments: you would pay
attention to what they do with their time. And the answer would be:
this is what they do, this is what we do with our time. We are
immersed in this kind of experience with images, sounds, and stories.
Now what does that have to do with our knowledge of the political
world? Again, let me offer a few facts that have loomed large in the
most sophisticated people's attempts to come to grips with the meaning
of our trajectory as a democracy in a time of media saturation. You
may have heard the debates a few years ago attached to a book with
the marvelous title, Bowling Alone, a book by a political scientist,
Robert Putnam. He chose that title because he observed that while
Americans seem to be spending more money and time bowling, that
bowling leagues were dwindling, and so he deduced that insofar as
people were still bowling, they were bowling alone. He looked at data
about how people spent their time and what kinds of connections they
had to organizations of all kinds, not just bowling leagues: other kinds
of sports leagues, PTAs, church groups, and civic associations of all
sorts. He looked at their participation in political parties, whether they
vote or not, and so on. He found that whatever fields of organizational
connection, whatever fields of social life you looked at, Americans
were doing less of it today than they were doing thirty or forty years
ago. Americans were belonging less and they were also voting less,
which is the issue that I want to focus on. Putnam got hold of the best
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data he could get for what might correlate with people voting or not,
and he discovered something extremely interesting: people who read
newspapers were more likely to be voters; people who watched
television were less likely to vote, less likely to attend public meetings,
less likely to serve in organizations, less likely to sign petitions than
people who were otherwise identical to them in terms of education,
age, race, and so on, but were spending less time with television. The
more television people say they watch, the less likely they are to be
registered to vote.
What's even more striking is that people who watch television
generally can be said to watch television in one of two quite different
ways: people in the television business refer to one kind as
``appointment viewing.'' I'm going to watch the news at 6:30, I'm going
to watch Friends at whatever time, I'm going to watch the basketball
game at such and such a time. Then there are other people who when
they watch television, they say that they turn on the TV and they watch
whatever's on. The percentage of people who say they watch whatever's
on has skyrocketed in the last twenty-five years. It is now about half the
people who watch television. It was considerably less than that: it was
about a third in the mid-1970s.
You can see how all these factors are lining up. People who are
attached to television in particular, whose life involves substantially
immersing themselves in the spectacle of unending television, are the
people who have unplugged from social life, including their lives as
political citizens. It's too early to know if this same thing applies to
people who are big Internet users. It's also too early to say whether this
increased voter turnout in 2004 is the beginning of a major
countertrend.
Robert Putnam, in his book Bowling Alone, looked at a whole
range of factors that might be the cause or part of the cause of the
withdrawal from political life, the withdrawal from social organization,
and so on, and found that of all the factors that one might consider ─
and believe me, he is extremely thorough about this ─ the single most
influential factor is television. And it's really not spectacularly
complicated, at least part of the explanation is not spectacularly
complicated; insofar as you're spending an additional hour a day
watching television, which is roughly the case for Americans, you have
that much less time, that much less energy, that much less attention to
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spare for the rest of what one might otherwise be doing. People ─ and
this is not only true in the United States ─ who watch a great deal of
television know less about politics, less about the world, feel less able to
effect government, and are less interested in politics. When I say
politics, I mean political knowledge.
What is it about the experience of television ─ and, I should add,
other media, but we have more evidence about television ─ that
harmonizes with the ambient ignorance that I have described? I don't
want to dwell on this at great length, but I think it's evident if we inspect
our own experience with the medium ─ this is certainly true for me ─
that what we expect from television is a state of mind that has an
emotional verve, a sensational capacity that entices our interest and
keeps our attention, but at the same time doesn't demand so much of
us that we feel engulfed by the emotions and sensations that result. In
other words, television and media in general, I would argue, work best
by enticing us to experience what I think of as disposable emotion:
emotions that don't demand very much of us, limited liability
emotions, emotions and sensations that satisfy us that some life is
taking place within us, some connections are being made.
If you deplore this sort of experience, you might call it distracting.
But if you are neutral about it, you might simply observe ─ our visiting
Martian would observe ─ that people are compelled sufficiently, by
media experience, to feel that there is value in that experience. After
all, they are not being dragooned into watching television or listening to
music or listening to the radio or any other kind of media experience
at the point of a gun. This is, in fact, a choice that people are making,
to have a certain kind of experience, and that kind of experience is not
the experience of knowledge. It's not the experience of mastery of the
world. It is experience of a kind of surfing the worlds, of a kind of
pleasure in the movement of the world, a kind of satisfaction in the
charges and challenges, the electricity of the world. That is the kind of
experience that people have made central to their way of life.
This, I think, helps me understand how it could be that a
population better educated than ever before, and in fact better
educated than any people have ever been in recorded history, could
still be no more knowledgeable about the world and about political
figures than they were when they were less educated. To compress it, I
would say that the experience people have in school is the experience
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of a formal curriculum that is engulfed by an informal curriculum. And
the informal curriculum is the media, it's the experience of the media.
This is what people deeply know. This is the kind of experience that
people deeply rely on. This is the user-friendly environment which is
ours, and it is a useable environment which, as I'm sure you know
from your courses, inspires the creation and the perfection of what I
think of as an attention-getting industry that, recognizing our desires for
media experience, has cultivated extremely sophisticated ways of
getting us to pay attention, which they are extremely good at. It's not
that some drug has been administered to us unknowingly, but rather
because we cherish that experience, and they know it.
So, the media, with their emotional payoffs and their sensational
everyday experience, do become the soundtrack of life, and that
soundtrack of life is not conducive to the amalgamation and the
perfection of information that is capable of being converted into
useable knowledge. This is not the education of citizens, this is the
education of consumers. And again, it's not a plot that's been done to
us: it is the collective creation of collective desire. And this is why it is
deeply difficult to imagine repealing it. This is who we have become,
and there's not a substantial number who wish to be anything else but
that.
In his introduction, Sid Gottlieb promised that I would have
something inspiring to say, and I don't think that I've succeeded. And I
don't think that I want to succeed if inspiration is neglect of reality. I
think we have altogether too much neglect of reality, and as I think
about the quality of ambient ignorance which I have described, and
which I think is our collective condition, and as I have looked for the
depth of the causes that might be accountable for it, I haven't been able
to come up with a happy ending.
I don't want to contribute any more illusions to the collective
fascination. But I do want to end on at least a grace note of possibility,
and it is the following: While there's no question but that the process
I've described is capable of enticing people and satisfying them with the
private satisfactions of everyday life that are becoming routine, it's also
true, at least to date, that when the world as it appears to be intrudes in
their private life, when the world explodes on you, when the building
down the way is obliterated, when the environment that you inhabit
becomes physically dangerous, that people are then struck ─ belatedly,
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but nonetheless struck ─ by the discrepancy between what they thought
the world was like and what they then discover it is. And it is under
those circumstances that people are aroused and that Americans ─
among others ─ ask themselves how it could be that they have
misunderstood their real situation. Then they transform their
circumstances. This doesn't happen very often, but Lincoln was right:
you can fool some of the people all of the time, and you can fool all of
the people some of the time. But at least there's no evidence that you
can fool all of the people all of the time, and on that note, I will stake
my hope.
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